According to the Kyodo news agency, on December 17th a senior government official involved in the revision of the three national security documents adopted in 2022 expressed his personal stance
on the need for Japan to equip itself with nuclear weapons. In light of the severe security situation
surrounding the archipelago and the questionable reliability of the American nuclear deterrent
, Tokyo must recognise that it can only rely on itself
. Although the creation of a national arsenal is unrealistic and difficult
, given that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) recognises only five nuclear States de jure
, nonetheless this discussion must take place within the government
.
The official denies having discussions with Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi about the revision of the three non-nuclear principles
(not to possess, manufacture, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan) established in 1967, principles that the prime minister has claimed would form part of the revision of national security documents. At present, it is premature to state precisely what their wording will be
. According to the source cited by Kyodo, it will take significant political will
to revise them.
Enhanced trial balloon
Based on somewhat ambiguous references in the South Korean press, the anonymous source is believed to be former Air Force General Sadamasa Oue. Born in 1959, and a native of Nara (like the prime minister), he took office in October 2025 as a member of the national security secretariat. For the armed forces, he oversaw the introduction of F-35 fighter jets for the Air Force, the missile defence programme, and the reorganisation of the Joint Staff Office. In 2020, together with three other former senior officers from the three branches of the armed forces, he published a paper on the invasion of Taiwan and the security of Japan, stating that Japan and Taiwan are a community of destiny
, and urged Tokyo to abandon its historical passivity
and adopt a more credible
deterrence posture. This would involve both revising the three non-nuclear principles and introducing a counterattack capability
based on long-range missiles such as Tomahawks, to deny China a quick victory
in the event of war.
Oue participated in the drafting of the national security law in 2015 and the formulation of the concept of existential threat scenarios
which justify military intervention. The Asahi Shimbun suggests that the statement to Kyodo cannot be accidental
. According to the Nikkei, the government is actively discussing the issue. In her 2024 manifesto Research on National Power, Takaichi stated that she considered it unrealistic not to allow
the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan if Tokyo expects the US to provide extended deterrence
: Maintaining the formula of support for the three principles could be an obstacle if we were to face an extreme crisis
.
According to various Japanese assessments, the statement attributed to Oue serves as a trial balloon
; it creates an opportunity to begin building consensus on the direction of Japanese security policy
. Tokyo, which is grappling with a diplomatic crisis with Beijing over a previous statement by the prime minister to the National Diet, is engaged in talks with Washington. The State Department has reiterated that the national security doctrine presented on December 4th, with its unusual presidential preface, reaffirms the maintenance of the most robust, credible, and modern nuclear deterrent to protect America and our allies
. It also recalls Japan’s global role as an American partner in non-proliferation and advancing arms control
. Shinjiro Koizumi, minister of defence, nevertheless stressed that the continued commitment to the three principles does not preclude a discussion of all options
, as it is simply natural for Japan to explore them without exception
. This was echoed by Taro Kono, former defence and foreign minister under Shinzo Abe, who believes that nuclear weapons should no longer be considered taboo
, and that a decision concerning their possession should be reached on the basis of their advantages and disadvantages
.
The invisible swords
of latency
As pointed out on other occasions, Tokyo has elevated the practice of evoking nuclear latency
for political purposes almost to an art form. Vipin Narang, a former defence official in the Biden administration, says that Tokyo updates its feasibility studies on a nuclear arsenal, which date back to 1971, every ten years
. However, it has deliberately signalled its threshold status with increasing frequency since the 1990s [Seeking the Bomb, 2022], wielding what Lee Seung-heon, a researcher in Seoul, calls its invisible sword
. Japan is officially
a non-nuclear State. But it has in its sheath the invisible sword
of the complete cycle of nuclear fuel enrichment and re-processing, as well as the separation of plutonium: it has the capacity to produce a nuclear weapon in six months
, being able to operate within the NPT and possessing one of the most advanced nuclear infrastructures in the world
.
Tokyo secured this model of soft deterrence
in the nuclear agreement with the US initiated in the 1970s, signed in 1986 by Yasuhiro Nakasone and Ronald Reagan, and ratified in 1988. This 30-year agreement was extended in 2018. For Lee, this is the model that Seoul should pursue. If Korea were to equip itself with the iron sword
of nuclear weapons, as many are calling for, it could not only trigger a global domino effect
, with repercussions from Taipei to the Middle East, but also provoke a Chinese reaction that would dwarf
the economic coercive measures adopted in 2016-17 in response to the deployment of the US THAAD anti-missile system on the peninsula. Above all, it would give the Japanese hawks
a pretext for including independent nuclear capabilities in their constitutional revision
. Instead, the invisible path
, opened up by the late-October agreements on nuclear submarines between Washington and Seoul, would give the latter the legal possibility, within the NPT, to have a six-month deterrent
in case of need. South Korea would no longer be forced to gamble its survival
on the basis of other people’s promises
.
According to Henry Sokolski, a former Pentagon official, Tokyo’s latent capabilities are: a stockpile of 46 tonnes of plutonium, sufficient for three thousand warheads
; H3 solid-fuel carriers
, with potential intercontinental reach, suitable for carrying a nuclear warhead; and three advanced nuclear fusion research centres
, capable of producing enhanced fission and thermonuclear weapons
. The cost of a minimum deterrent
would, in his opinion, be around $6 billion and would take no more than twelve months. For comparison, this is the amount allocated by Tokyo to its arsenal of conventional medium-range missiles.
Selective proliferation?
In early December, the Sankei Shimbun commented on an article in Foreign Affairs by two academics from the University of Oklahoma, Moritz Graefrath and Mark Raymond. Their thesis is that, in order to reduce its own deterrence costs and strengthen its extended deterrence, the US should actively encourage allies such as Germany, Japan, and Canada to develop their own nuclear weapons
. In East Asia, this policy of selective proliferation
would act to counter the erosion of American deterrence capabilities caused by China’s nuclear rearmament. The Sankei Shimbun rightly does not consider this position to be an official line from Washington, but rather part of a reflection on Japan’s deterrence.
For the Sankei, the seminal text is Japan’s Nuclear Option [1975] by John Endicott, a US Air Force officer who reported on the debate, Japan’s capabilities, and — as a theoretical hypothesis — on the means of sufficient deterrence
for Tokyo: this deterrence would take the form of a dozen nuclear missile submarines
, armed with carriers similar to Polaris and theoretically capable of destroying 25% of the USSR’s population
. This is not dissimilar to the French force de frappe model or the British model from the 1980s onwards. Some of Endicott’s assessments, writes the Sankei, may be valid for today’s debate
. The Japanese nationalist newspaper sees in the theses of the two American academies a sign of a change in the prevailing strategic mood
in Washington, thanks to the emphasis that the US National Security Strategy (NSS) itself places on sharing the burdens of alliance, the primacy of US national interests
, the search for détente with China, and the reference to the Monroe Doctrine. None of these elements offer much comfort to Tokyo or Seoul.
The diplomatic crisis with Beijing, triggered by Takaichi’s words about the circumstances of an existential threat
to Japan, an argument never explicitly stated by Abe when he was head of government, appears to stem from what she herself described as excessive frankness. This is a characteristic attributed to natives of Kansai who, according to The Japan Times, tend to be more direct in Japanese terms: the prime minister often uses the dialect of the Osaka region, which is unusual
in Japanese politics.
Nuclear Kabuki
and Noh
Her predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba, although trained in the school of the outspoken and pro-Chinese Kakuei Tanaka, stressed that under no circumstances
should war scenarios be discussed publicly
and that disclosing where nuclear weapons are deployed
in Japan does not strengthen deterrence.
This is an oblique reference to a corollary of the non-introduction
— or fourth non-nuclear principle
— negotiated privately between Tokyo and Washington. For decades, Japan, despite having the right to prior information
from the US about the presence of nuclear weapons in the country, has never exercised it. For Ishiba, conservatism does not mean wrapping oneself in the flag and shouting
, but rather respecting traditional [Japanese] values
. Moreover, the Kyodo Shimbun points out that the official statement by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expresses America’s aspiration to support its [Japanese] ally
but seeks to avoid provoking
China. This assessment is similar to that of Li Haidong, a former Chinese diplomat, in the Global Times: amid the disputes between Tokyo and Beijing, the US does not intend to abandon its own interests or harm China’s vital interests
.
Takaichi has re-established a slim majority in the lower house and remains popular. In her apprenticeship as prime minister, it seems that critics are suggesting that she follows the tradition of Noh theatre rather than Kabuki. In the former, which is solemn, the actors wear impenetrable wooden masks and the acting relies on gestures, which must be interpreted. In the latter, which is much livelier, the actors have painted faces to highlight moods or specific characters drawn from everyday life. Emerging from strategic ambiguity always comes at a price.
Lotta Comunista, December 2025